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A PRICE TAG ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: GEORGIA V. WEIS 
AND INDIGENT RIGHT TO CONTINUED COUNSEL
By: Katy Bosse 1
“Thou shalt not ration justice.” –Judge 
Learned Hand2
 On February 2, 2006, Jamie 
Weis was arrested and charged with the 
robbery and murder of  a local senior 
citizen.3  Nearly seven months after 
his initial arrest, the state notified the 
Griffin trial court of  its intention to 
seek the death penalty.4  In the Georgia 
Public Defender system, created by the 
Georgia Indigent Defense Act of  2003, 
all death penalty cases are assigned 
to the Georgia Capital Defender 
Division instead of  the local public 
defender’s office.5  In Weis’s case, the 
overseeing Georgia Public Defender 
Standards Council determined that 
the Capital Defenders Division had a 
tremendous caseload.6  And instead of  
assigning another case to the already 
overtaxed Capital Defenders Division, 
the Council decided to assign private 
attorneys Robert Citronberg and 
Thomas West on a contractual basis.7
  From January 24, 2007 
through November 26, 2007, the 
defense attorneys filed over sixty 
motions on Weis’s behalf.8  During that 
time, the Georgia Capital Defenders 
also handled the high profile case of  
Brian Nichols,9 which exhausted most 
of  its 2007 annual budget and depleted 
the funds available for other cases.10 
Citronberg and West filed for four 
continuances between January 24 and 
November 26, 2007,11 because the state 
could no longer afford to pay them for 
their time.12  On November 26, 2007, 
District Attorney Scott Ballard made 
an oral motion to remove Citronberg 
and West from the case, and suggested 
that attorneys from the local public 
defender’s office be placed on the case 
instead.13  Judge Caldwell sustained the 
state’s motion and removed Citronberg 
and West.14  Subsequently, two public 
defenders, Tamara Jacobs and Joseph 
Saia, were assigned as counsel.15 
 This article explores the 
origins of  an indigent defendant’s right 
to counsel and demonstrates how the 
facts of  the Weis case illustrate the 
need for a definitive right to continued 
counsel.  Part I traces the procedural 
history of  Weis, the history of  the 
right to counsel in America, and the 
current jurisdictional split on the right 
to continued counsel.  Part II analyzes 
the current Supreme Court language 
on indigent right to continued counsel, 
and suggests how Weis provides an 
opportunity for the Court to resolve the 
issue in favor of  indigent defendants. 
Analyzing the procedural history and 
arguments described below, it is evident 
that denying Weis the right to retain 
his court appointed counsel violates 
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, because he was without effective 
counsel for over a year during which the 
prosecution continued to mount its case.
I. How We Got to a Continued 
Counsel Split
a. The Georgia Decision
“I guess the Supreme Court will 
have to earn their money.” –Judge 
Caldwell16
 
On  December 10, 2007, the 
two public defenders assigned to Weis’s 
case, Jacobs and Saia, filed a motion 
to withdraw as counsel due to “their 
inability to duplicate the familiarity 
with the case.”17  The motion was 
denied.18  Subsequently, Weis filed 
another motion on December 20, 
which contained an affidavit from 
Joseph Saia that detailed the current 
workload of  his office and his ninety-
one open felony cases.19  Additionally, 
Weis and his public defenders filed 
several other motions to withdraw, 
along with a motion requesting Judge 
Caldwell recuse himself  from the 
case, and a petition for mandamus and 
prohibition against Judge Caldwell.20
 On April 25, 2008, the 
Georgia Capital Defenders indicated in 
discussions that funding would again 
be available to Citronberg and West. 
However, when provided a contract, 
the Georgia Capital Defenders refused 
to process the bills.21  On December 
31, 2008, Weis filed a petition for a writ 
of  mandamus against the judge and the 
Public Defender Standards Council, 
which was dropped after the judge agreed 
to reinstate Citronberg and West.22
 Citronberg and West were re-
assigned as counsel on February 11, 
2009.23  However, as a New York Times 
article describes, “[the][p]rosecutors 
had steadily built a case while the 
defense did nothing. Leads went 
cold, memories faded, witnesses went 
missing.”24  Nevertheless, the trial 
was set for August 3rd, 2009, with 
evidentiary motions scheduled for July 
8, 2009.25  On July 8, Weis filed a motion 
to dismiss due to the denial of  his right 
to a speedy trial.26  The motion was 
denied and counsel appealed.27  The 
decision was affirmed by the Georgia 
Supreme Court on March 25, 2010.28
 The Georgia Supreme Court 
analyzed the case under the Barker 
v. Wingo four-part balancing test for 
assessing a speedy trial claim.29  Under 
the test, a court must balance (1) the 
length of  the delay and (2) the reasons 
for the delay with (3) the defendant’s 
assertion of  a right to a speedy trial and 
(4) the prejudice to the defendant.30  The 
court found that the length of  the delay 
did not violate the defendant’s right to 
a speedy trial, and that the reasons for 
the delay did not constitute a “systemic 
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breakdown of  the public defender 
system.”31  The court concluded that 
the delay was due to Weis’s failure 
to cooperate with Jacobs and Saia, 
the public defenders appointed after 
Citronberg and West were removed.32
  Specifically, the court ruled 
that a defendant could not assert the 
right of  counsel of  choice to delay 
judicial proceedings.33  The court 
acknowledged that the lack of  funding 
contributed to the delay but decided 
that it was not the sole factor.34  The 
court ruled that a lack of  funding from 
the Georgia Capital Defenders was 
not a “systemic breakdown” of  the 
public defender system, and thus was 
not the primary reason for the delay.35 
Instead, the court found that the 
defendant’s conduct and the conduct 
of  Citronberg and West, i.e., not being 
able to work without compensation, 
was the primary reason for the delay.36 
Rather than acknowledge that the 
state’s public defender system had 
failed the very people it was designed 
to protect, the court chose to blame the 
two appointed public defenders, Jacobs 
and Saia, and Weis for not being able 
to easily replicate an attorney-client 
relationship.37  The court also ruled 
that Weis did not assert his right to a 
speedy trial in a timely manner,38 and 
there was no evidence of  oppressive 
pre-trial incarceration or proof  that 
Weis had been subjected to substandard 
conditions in the county jail.39
 Conversely, the dissent 
examined the right of  an indigent 
defendant to continued counsel, 
citing the Alabama Court of  Criminal 
Appeals decision Lane v. Alabama, 
which quotes Smith v. Superior 
Court of  Los Angeles County:
[O]nce counsel is 
appointed to represent 
an indigent defendant, 
whether it [is] the public 
defender or a volunteer 
private attorney, the 
parties enter into 
an attorney-client 
relationship which 
is no less inviolable 
than if  counsel had 
been retained.  To 
hold otherwise 
would be to subject 
that relationship 
to an unwarranted 
and invidious 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
arising merely from 
the poverty of  the 
accused.40
 The dissent concluded that 
a defendant should not be forced to 
choose between his original counsel 
and new counsel in order to receive 
a speedy trial at the hands of  the 
state.41  The dissent also correctly 
assailed the majority’s argument by 
emphasizing that Weis could hardly 
be held responsible for the delay when 
the public defenders assigned to the 
case requested to be removed almost 
immediately.42  The majority also erred, 
the dissent indicated, in finding that 
Weis and his attorneys were at fault, 
when it was the state’s organization 
that initially hired and then could not 
compensate Citronberg and West.43 
The dissent reasoned that even though 
the state agency is focused on the 
defense rather than the prosecution of  
criminals, the state is still obligated to 
provide adequate funding, concluding 
that the state’s budgetary constraints 
were not a valid excuse for depriving 
a citizen his appointed counsel.44
 After the unfavorable Georgia 
Supreme Court decision, Citronberg 
and West filed a petition for writ of  
certiorari before the Supreme Court of  
the United States.45  The writ called for 
the Court to resolve the division among 
state courts regarding indigent defense 
and the continuity of  representation.46 
On October 4th, 2010, the Court denied 
the petition for writ without comment.47
b. The History of  the Right to 
Counsel
“[T]here [is] an absolute right to 
appointment of  counsel in felony 
cases. . . . [A]ppointment of  counsel 
for an indigent is required at every 
stage of  a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of  a criminal 
accused might be affected.”48
 The Sixth Amendment of  the 
United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial . . . and to 
have the [a]ssistance of  [c]ounsel for 
his defen[s]e.”49  The Supreme Court 
first recognized the fundamental 
nature of  the right to counsel in 1932 
in Powell v. Alabama, noting that the 
assistance of  counsel was essential to 
a fair trial.50  Later, in the landmark 
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright, the 
Supreme Court recognized this 
right for indigent defendants, stating 
“[t]he right of  one charged with [a] 
crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials 
in some countries, but it is in ours.”51 
The Gideon Court held that when a 
defendant is unable to obtain counsel, 
the state must assign counsel because 
“[t]his noble ideal cannot be realized if  
the poor man charged with crime has 
to face his accusers without a lawyer to 
assist him.”52  However, the decision 
in Gideon, while obligating the states to 
appoint counsel, maintained a narrow 
focus that did not identify to what 
extent the right to counsel extended.53
 While states instituted Gideon’s 
mandate with varying success, the 
Supreme Court continued to attempt 
to define the right to counsel and its 
effect on the practice of  criminal law. 
In 1970, the Court indirectly analogized 
that the right to counsel was the right to 
competent counsel.  In 1983, in Morris 
v. Slappy, the assigned public defender 
fell ill and the client was assigned 
a new public defender rather than 
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being granted a continuance.54  The 
Supreme Court in Morris held that the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
a meaningful relationship between a 
defendant and counsel.55  However, in 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, 
he argued that judicial efficiency should 
not stand in the way of  an indigent 
defendant’s continued representation 
by an attorney with whom he has a 
relationship of  trust and confidence.56
 This point aside, viewing the 
Court’s decisions from 1970-1983 
retrospectively, had the court drafted 
clearer language regarding the right 
to counsel, the Court could have 
reshaped attitudes and created a much 
more organized and superior indigent 
defense system.57  Had the Court been 
more willing to provide guidelines 
for what constitutes meaningful 
representation, the Court would 
have likely drafted a set of  minimum 
requirements that all public defenders 
must meet when conducting a criminal 
defense.  Furthermore, State legislatures 
could have taken such standards into 
account when drafting legislation 
and appropriating funds to the state 
criminal defense agencies.  However, 
without such standards, many states 
are unable to effectively allocate the 
appropriate level of  funds needed by 
these agencies, and as a result, those 
needing representation, the state 
agencies, and the already dwindling 
budgets suffered.58  The vague 
standard of  “effective” allowed state 
legislatures to both design and fund 
the bare minimum of  criminal defense.
 Finally, in 1984 in Strickland 
v. Washington, the Court attempted to 
address the guidelines of  what should 
constitute “effective counsel.”59  In 
an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the 
Court adopted the standard adopted by 
all the Federal Courts of  Appeals and 
held that assistance of  counsel should 
be “reasonably effective.”60  The Court 
adopted a two-prong analysis that 
considers “(1) whether the lawyer’s 
performance fell below acceptable 
levels and (2) whether that performance 
prejudiced the accused.”61  Although 
the Court refused to set rigid standards 
for what qualifies as reasonable, 
Justice O’Connor enumerated basic 
duties of  counsel: to be loyal, to avoid 
conflicts of  interest, to advocate the 
defendant’s cause, and to consult with 
the defendant on important decisions.62 
Justice O’Connor also suggested that 
American Bar Association (ABA) 
guidelines should help to determine 
what is reasonable, and that strict 
rules on reasonableness should be 
avoided so as to give counsel flexibility 
in making strategic decisions.63
 Justice Marshall, in his dissent 
in Strickland, laments the majority’s 
refusal to set stricter standards for the 
definition of  “reasonably effective.”64 
He describes the many aspects of  
the criminal defense system, such 
as preparing for trial, applying for 
bail, making timely objections, and 
filing for appeals, that would all 
benefit from judicial oversight.65  As 
Justice Marshall’s dissent points out, 
the majority’s vague language in 
Strickland left the states on their own 
to determine how to enforce Gideon’s 
right to counsel mandate.66  Justice 
Marshall reasoned that if  stricter and 
more specific standards for the various 
aspects of  trial had been concretely set, 
states would have had a clearer idea of  
how to build and fund their criminal 
defense systems.67  More importantly, 
the criminal justice system around 
the country could operate on a more 
uniform level, providing equal access 
and fair processing for all defendants.68
c. Varied State Responses 
 In the years since Strickland 
and Gideon, states have individually 
fashioned their own standards in 
defining what constitutes “reasonably 
effective” counsel.  Unfortunately, 
these standards can vary greatly from 
state to state.69  In 2004, forty years 
after Gideon, the ABA published 
a scathing report on the nation’s 
indigent defense systems.70  The 
report noted the extreme disparities 
in funding between the prosecution 
and the defense, the excessive caseload 
of  public defense attorneys, and 
the inadequate assistance provided 
to indigent defendants as a result.71
No standard provides more 
evidence of  the disparities in state 
systems than the right to continued 
counsel, also known as vertical 
representation.72  While Georgia and 
Louisiana still do not recognize an 
indigent defendant’s right to continued 
counsel, state courts have ruled that 
indigent defendants have a right to 
continued counsel as part of  their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  This 
point is evidenced by the fact that even 
the states surrounding Georgia have 
chosen to support and uphold the right 
to counsel for indigent defendants.73
 For example, in Lane v. 
Alabama, a defendant’s initial attorney 
was removed because of  the state’s 
intention to call him as a necessary 
witness.74  In assessing whether such 
an act violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, the 
court claimed that “[w]ith respect to 
continued representation . . . there is no 
distinction between indigent defendants 
and non-indigent defendants.”75 
Essentially, once counsel has been 
appointed, the trial judge is required to 
respect the attorney-client relationship 
as if  it were privately retained counsel.76 
Similarly, in Weaver v. Florida, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that the attorney-
client relationship is not dependant on 
the source of  compensation because 
the attorney should be loyal to the 
person he or she represents, not to 
the person who pays for the services.77
 States that recognize the right 
to continued counsel for indigent 
defendants have created exceptions 
to this right.  The Weaver court laid 
out several reasons why it may be 
appropriate to substitute counsel, such as 
incompetence, physical incapacitation, 
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inappropriate conduct, or the efficient 
administration of  justice.78  In Tennessee 
v. Huskey, a case in which the trial judge 
attempted to dismiss counsel for filing 
an abundance of  motions, the court 
analogized that an attorney-client 
relationship involves “an intimate 
process of  consultation and planning 
which culminates in a state of  trust 
and confidence between the client and 
his attorney.”79  The Tennessee court 
concluded that based on case law from 
other states, the removal of  original 
counsel is only permitted when all 
other remedies have been exhausted.80
  While many states have 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Gideon and Strickland to 
include an indigent right to continued 
counsel, Georgia and Louisiana have 
expressly denied the right of  an indigent 
defendant to retain counsel.81  In Weis, 
the Georgia Supreme court relied on the 
Louisiana decision, Louisiana v. Reeves, 
to support its holding that moving the 
case forward was a sufficient reason to 
justify the substitution of  counsel.82 
The facts of  Reeves are extremely similar 
to Weis, in that in Reeves the court 
removed non-local counsel who was 
paid by the Capital Defense Project, 
and replaced him with the local Chief  
Public Defender.83  The court justified 
the removal by claiming that the right 
to counsel of  choice does not extend 
to defendants who require court 
appointed counsel.84  In Louisiana, 
an indigent defendant is entitled 
only to “effective representation.”85
 The Sixth Circuit of  the 
United States Court of  Appeals 
upheld this interpretation of  the Sixth 
Amendment in Daniels v. Lafler.86  The 
Daniels court held that an indigent 
defendant represented by a court 
appointed attorney has no right to 
his or her choice of  counsel.87  While 
serving on the Second Circuit of  
the United States Court of  Appeals, 
current Supreme Court Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor also ruled that 
“there is no constitutional right to 
continuity of  appointed counsel.”88
II. Indigent Continued Counsel 
Needs More Support
a. A Meaningful Relationship
 The Supreme Court needs to 
clarify its dicta in Morris and hold that 
the non-existence of  a right to chosen 
counsel is not the denial of  a right to 
continued counsel once an attorney-
client relationship has been established. 
Determining that the Sixty Amendment 
guarantees a right to continued counsel 
does not overturn Morris, nor does it 
affect the Court’s decision that an 
indigent defendant does not have the 
right to choose his initial counsel. 
Instead, it extends the rights of  indigent 
defendants and grants them rights 
equal to defendants with paid counsel.
 The language used in Morris 
makes it clear that the Court was 
referring only to the creation of  
a new Sixth Amendment right to 
“meaningful representation.”  The 
frequently quoted language reads:
No court could 
possibly guarantee 
that a defendant will 
develop the kind 
of  rapport with his 
attorney – privately 
retained or provided 
by the public – that 
the Court of  Appeals 
thought part of  the 
Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of  counsel.  
Accordingly, we reject 
the claim that the 
Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a 
“ m e a n i n g f u l 
relationship” between 
an accused and his 
counsel.89
 Rejecting the idea that the Sixth 
Amendment contains a guarantee of  a 
“meaningful relationship” between the 
defendant and counsel is not the same 
as rejecting an indigent defendant’s 
right to retain his original counsel 
once an attorney-client relationship 
has been forged.  While the court has 
been explicit that it will not create 
a constitutional guarantee that the 
relationship will be meaningful, they 
have not denied a defendant’s right 
to continuity of  appointed counsel. 
b. Strickland’s Vagueness Problem
 The reasonableness standard 
set forth in Strickland is intentionally 
vague.  While the court does not set 
specific standards, Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion makes it clear that standard legal 
practice and ABA guidelines should guide 
both lawyers and judges to determine 
what constitutes a reasonably effective 
level of  counsel.90  Unfortunately, as 
Kim Taylor-Thompson, a veteran 
Washington, D.C. public defender, 
explains, “[t]he unappreciated cost of  
the Court’s lack of  specificity has been 
a legacy of  ineffective assistance that 
has now shifted the onus of  defining 
the components of  the right to counsel 
to the indigent defense community.”91 
As a result of  the vague standard in 
Strickland, an indigent defendant is 
currently only entitled to relief  if  the 
court appoints a new attorney and 
does not allow for sufficient time to 
prepare, thus forcing the counsel’s 
representation to be ineffective.92
 The current ABA Ten Principles 
of  a Public Defender System guide maintains 
that “the same attorney continuously 
represents the client until completion 
of  the case.”93  Additionally, the guide 
further asserts that the same attorney 
should represent the client from the 
initial assignment through the trial and 
sentencing.94  In Gideon’s Broken Promise, 
the ABA’s 2004 study of  the nation’s 
indigent criminal defense standards, 
the ABA reported that national 
standards have long recognized a right 
to continued counsel as an essential 
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component of  an effective defense 
practice.95  The same study also 
found that many states still practiced 
“horizontal representation,” where 
multiple public defenders handled 
different aspects of  a single case.96 
In contrast, the study reported that, 
in some states, the same prosecutor 
handled the prosecution of  a defendant 
from beginning to end, largely due 
to the ample funding available to 
the state’s prosecuting agency.97
c. Strickland’s Guidelines
 The language used in Strickland 
demonstrates that even though the court 
has been vague in its rulings on what 
constitutes “effective representation,” 
the duties they believe apply to all 
defense attorneys are more effectively 
performed when there is a right to 
continued counsel.  The Court stated 
that “the Sixth Amendment imposes 
on counsel a duty to investigate,”98 
and that “access to counsel’s skill and 
knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the ‘ample opportunity 
to meet the case of  the prosecution’ 
to which they are entitled.”99  Based 
on the author’s experience observing 
and clerking in several public defender 
offices and local criminal court 
systems, when multiple attorneys 
handle a single case, investigation is 
often neglected or left until witnesses’ 
memories have faded and the “trail” 
has gone cold.  Similarly, the author 
has also found that each attorney 
might have different knowledge and 
defense strategies that will affect the 
outcome of  a case.  Switching between 
attorneys causes confusion not only 
for the defendant, but also for the 
prosecuting attorney who must adjust 
to different defense strategies, and 
the judges who must rule on differing 
motions filed by different attorneys 
or rule on the same motion several 
times due to the change in counsel. 
 The Strickland Court also 
imposed a “duty of  loyalty” and “the 
more particular duties to consult with 
the defendant on important decisions 
and to keep the defendant informed of  
important developments in the course 
of  the prosecution.”100  Continuing to 
keep the client informed of  important 
developments, seeking the client’s 
opinion on important decisions, 
and guiding the client through those 
decisions are extremely difficult when 
the same attorney does not represent 
the client throughout the entire case.
d. The Benefits of  Continued Counsel
 The language in Strickland, 
though vague, makes it clear that 
the Supreme Court upholds certain 
standards for effective criminal defense, 
all of  which are easier to adhere to 
when there is continued counsel.  A 
lack of  continued counsel generates 
the following problems: (1) it prevents 
the establishment of  an attorney-client 
relationship, (2) it encourages a lack 
of  accountability, and (3) it increases 
the likelihood that necessary and 
important work will be neglected as 
the case moves between attorneys.101
i. The Attorney-Client 
Relationship
 The relationship between 
an attorney and a client is a vital 
component of  conducting an effective 
defense.  Ideally, a defense attorney 
creates a collaborative relationship with 
a client, instead of  merely dictating 
to the client his decisions and legal 
strategy.  A collaborative relationship 
requires open communication, which 
necessitates a substantial amount of  
interaction between the attorney and 
client.  Through this communication, 
the attorney and the client will 
collaboratively answer many of  the 
essential questions that are presented 
during a criminal trial, such as how 
to plead, whether to proceed to trial, 
and whether or not the client should 
testify.  To answer these questions 
and facilitate open communication, 
many public defender offices view 
continued counsel as a fundamental 
requirement.102  By being involved in a 
case from beginning to end, an attorney 
can track the case’s investigation, 
and become better informed about 
the facts and key issues, allowing 
for more effective representation. 
ii. Lack of  Accountability
 Similarly, when a client moves 
between multiple attorneys during the 
progression of  a case, files get lost, 
motions are not filed, and discovery 
does not get examined.  Because a new 
attorney may have been assigned to a 
specific portion of  the case, or perhaps 
has taken over the case completely, a 
predicament is created in which the 
client does not know who to go to for 
information, or even what information 
is needed.  This disorganization 
fosters a lack of  accountability and 
usually results in inadequate defense. 
A client, particularly an indigent 
client, is generally unaware and does 
not understand the legal process and 
procedural requirements for motions 
for continuances, or the steps to 
assure that previous motions were 
filed correctly.  When more than one 
attorney represents a client at different 
junctures throughout the case, the 
client does not know whom to hold 
accountable, and thus, is without 
recourse.  A right to continued counsel 
ensures that the client knows exactly 
who to contact and would also hold the 
specific attorney accountable for all files 
and motions associated with the case. 
iii. Neglected Work
 Attorneys also differ in 
their trial strategy, oratory skills, and 
the weight they give to certain legal 
issues.103  The same case in the hands 
of  two different attorneys can look 
extremely different; thus, a client may 
suffer from an involuntary change in 
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counsel.  Following an involuntary 
change in counsel, the new attorney 
may develop a divergent strategy or 
need to re-conduct investigation. 
But most important, a new attorney 
must gain the defendant’s trust.  The 
chances of  discovery being overlooked 
or a motion not being filed in a 
timely manner increase exponentially 
when a case shifts between attorneys.
 A right to continued counsel 
permits continued communication 
between the client and counsel that 
builds client confidence and enables 
the relationship to evolve over 
time.104  Evidenced by the irrefutable 
benefits of  continued counsel detailed 
above, to deny a defendant continued 
counsel undermines their Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance 
of  counsel.  As Anne Poulin, a 
Villanova law professor and prolific 
writer on Criminal Procedure, argues 
in Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s 
Right to Counsel, “[a] defendant 
should not be forced to reestablish 
an attorney-client relationship 
with each of  a series of  attorneys, 
repeatedly explaining the case and her 
understanding of  it to new counsel.”105
e. Jamie Weis’s Lasting Legacy
“Whenever possible, substitution of  
counsel over the defendant’s objection 
should be avoided. Changing 
counsel without the defendant’s 
consent reduces the likelihood that 
the defendant will receive effective 
assistance, and will perceive the 
process as fair.”106
 In Weis, Citronberg and West, 
Weis’s original counsel, though court 
appointed, worked tirelessly for over 
a year to investigate and prepare 
Weis’s capital murder defense.  They 
developed an open communication 
with Weis and learned about his mental 
health problems, family history, and his 
life both before and after the alleged 
murder.  Weis submitted an affidavit 
stating that he could “trust Mr. West 
and Mr. Citronberg with my case and 
. . . my life.  They truly care about me 
and I believe they have the knowledge 
and skill to prepare a defense.”107 
The public defenders assigned to 
replace Citronberg and West did 
not have access to investigators 
trained in uncovering the mitigating 
circumstances surrounding Weis’s case, 
which can be pivotal in a capital murder 
defense.  When Citronberg and West 
were removed from the case, more than 
a year lapsed in which there was no 
investigation.  Based on the Supreme 
Court’s language in Strickland, it is 
evident that once West and Citronberg 
were removed from the case, there was 
no longer “effective” representation. 
 The procedural history of  this 
case raises a myriad of  issues.  Ranging 
from the state’s burden to fund its 
criminal defense and prosecution 
agencies equally, to the attempts on 
the part of  Citronberg and West to use 
Weis’s case as a test case for structural 
litigation to improve Georgia’s indigent 
defense system.  The most obvious, 
however, is whether Weis has the same 
right to keep his original counsel, as 
he would if  he had privately retained 
counsel with his own funds.  When 
Judge Caldwell removed Citronberg 
and West, despite Weis’s objections, and 
replaced them with public defenders 
who were unable to continue the 
work necessary to provide Weis with 
effective counsel, they effectively 
denied Weis’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
 The Supreme Court of  
Georgia and the Supreme Court of  
Louisiana both cite Morris in their 
rulings. Both courts held that there is 
no right to “meaningful representation” 
between an attorney and a client, 
and also that there is no right for an 
indigent defendant to choose his 
initial attorney.  Accordingly, both 
concluded that an indigent defendant 
has no right to continuity of  appointed 
counsel, regardless of  the established 
attorney-client relationship.  Both the 
prosecution and the Georgia Supreme 
Court have misinterpreted these rulings 
when they connote that there is no 
right to continued counsel to be found 
in the Sixth Amendment.108   While the 
obvious solution to the prosecution 
in Weis was to replace Citronberg and 
West, who refused to continue without 
pay, with already salaried public 
defenders, the Constitutional rights 
of  an indigent defendant are no less 
substantial because he or she is indigent. 
The benefits of  an attorney-client 
relationship and the continuity of  that 
relationship have been discussed above. 
These benefits are constitutionally 
guaranteed to those who retain private 
counsel, and should not be diminished 
for those who cannot.  Although they 
declined to do so in the Weis case, the 
Supreme Court needs to find that its 
language in Strickland and in Morris 
does not preclude it from holding 
that an indigent defendant has a right 
to retain counsel as if  he or she had 
privately retained the counsel.  To find 
otherwise is to put a price tag on our 
constitutional rights and continue to 
ignore the injustice that Gideon sought 
to correct over forty-five years ago.
Conclusion
 The Supreme Court has 
continually refused to set specific 
guidelines for effective counsel, 
assuming that states and local bar 
associations would conform to certain 
agreed-upon standards. However, 
twenty-five years after Strickland, it is 
clear that this is not always the case. 
The Court needs to recognize many of  
the base standards of  effective defense 
counsel, beginning with the right 
to continued counsel.  The Georgia 
Supreme Court erred in finding that 
Weis and his attorneys were to blame 
for the delay in his case, and thus, erred 
in concluding that it was acceptable 
to remove Weis’ original appointed 
counsel despite Weis’ objections.  The 
dissent in Weis was correct; a state 
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cannot adequately fund its prosecution 
and underfund its defense.109  However, 
the real harm done by the state’s lack 
of  funding was to deprive Weis of  his 
appointed counsel.  Depriving Weis 
of  his appointed counsel gave the 
prosecution an automatic advantage, 
and thus, denied Weis of  his 
Constitutional right to a fair trial.  The 
Supreme Court erred in not granting 
certiorari to Weis’s case and taking the 
opportunity to rule that a state cannot 
deny an indigent defendant his right 
to continued counsel. The State of  
Georgia has already begun applying its 
decision in Weis to other cases and will 
continue to deprive Georgia’s indigent 
defendants of  their constitutional rights 
until the Supreme Court takes action.110
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